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HOFSTRA IAW REVIEW
Volume 18, No. 4

Summer 1990

COPYRIGHTS AND COPYREMEDIES:
UNFAIR USE AND INJUNCTIONS
Honorable James L. Oakes*
Many areas of law contain doctrinal underpinnings that on
closer analysis collapse into themselves. One aspect of the law leads
to another, that to a third, and so on, until the observer is back at his
starting point and he knows little more than when he started. Analysis, rather than leading to an end result, takes him back to his starting premises. 1 We have long seen this phenomenon in constitutional
law as when considering which rights are. "fundamental" or which
classifications "suspect" in equal protection analysis. Ten years ago
I suggested what I am calling collapsibility (with a nod of acknowledgment to Professor Lance Liebman) in respect to takings law.3 In
takings law, two diametrically opposed lines of cases are available to
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This Article is
adapted from the Howard Kaplan Memorial Lecture, delivered by Chief Judge Oakes on May
3, 1989, at the Hofstra University School of Law.
1. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 1 (1940); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 3-4 (1974); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 13 (1943) (remarking that the distinction between tort and breach of contract is not "found ready made").
2. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6 (2d ed. 1988).
3. Oakes, "PropertyRights" in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REv. 583
(1981).
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the decision maker.4 The Supreme Court has come close to proving
they are collapsible with Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictus,5 where it held that a state law requiring coal mines to
provide support for surface housing was not a taking, the diametric
opposite of the oft-cited holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon", where a similar statute was held to be a taking.
Various attempts to break out of the "collapsible" doctrine are
regularly made. Thus Judge Posner, for example, by using the tool of
economic analysis, has tried to make such a break in respect to property, contract, and tort doctrines, among others. For the working
judge, Justice Kaplan has pointed out that it is sometimes better
when the judge seeks to formulate a rule of law that is both finely
tuned to accommodate the universal interests and demands at play,
as well as to do justice or equity in the individual case, to look to the
remedy rather than merely to the substantive rule of law - at least
to look to the relationship between the substantive rule of law and
the remedy or remedies that the courts may afford in a given case.
This seems simplistic, yet the history of the common law - the relationship between writ and right - supports its efficacy.8 For example, because we sense that the right to claim damages for expectation losses is a little less worthy of protection than the right to claim
damages for reliance losses, 9 we learn things, about the substantive
rights of a defrauded securities seller or buyer or an executory con4.

Id. at 609-21 (discussing recent Supreme Court takings cases with inconsistent

results).
5.

480 U.S. 470 (1987).

6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
7.

R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). Richard Posner, for exam-

ple, posits that the long-held differentiation between intentional and unintentional torts is "not
a fruitful one." Id. at 120; see also G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 131 n.35
(1977) (pointing out that Posner has been an influential spokesman for the point of view that
both laissez-faire economic theory and the legal structure were sound and, to the extent we
have abandoned either, salvation lies in returning to the true faith). But see Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. Rav. 451 (1974) (making an
analogy between Judge Posner's current economic analysis and the hero of an episodic novel,

encountering and dissolving one by one the evil dragons of legal analysis).
8.

Kaplan, Encounters with O.W. Holmes, Jr. in HOLMES AND THE COMMON LAW: A

CENTURY LATER 23 (1983).

9. 'This is a sense that cuts across various fields of law. See, e.g., L. Loss. FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 874-75 (2d ed. 1988). But see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4 (3d ed. 1987) (examining different kinds of interests protected by damages, namely, a restitution interest, a reliance interest and an expectation interest, and stating that when the expectancy interest is unavailable, the aggrieved party may
recover one or both of the restitution interest and reliance interest).
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tractor that we did not previously know. 10 In a way, I suppose, this is
but a reflection of judicial pragmatism: one looks at the consequences of a rule - the "workability factor."1
Karl Llewellyn differentiated between "the happy idealists and
the black-visaged cynics."1 2 The idealists conceive the law "as made
up of rules ... which are conceived to direct the course of action in
society,"'$ whereas the latter believe that "a right is best measured
by effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of
remedy is defect of right."' 4 Llewellyn goes on to conclude, preliminarily to be sure, that "[t]he differentiation between substantive law
and adjective law is an illusion,"' 5 while conceding that the presence
of this illusion itself has results in human behavior. 16
To further look at collapsibility and apply a pragmatic test to
illustrate my point, I have chosen copyright law. Viewing the law of
copyright sporadically, I have been constantly impressed how case
after case has seemed to be at the "cutting edge."1 7 L. Batlin &
Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 8 is one such case: the Uncle Sam bank case,
involving the question of whether a "modicum" of originality is necessary for copyright.1 " Absent this requirement almost everything
would be copyrightable. Another case was Financial Information,
Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service,2 0 involving the copyrightability of
compilations of data regarding municipal bonds - their date of issuance, interest rates, and so on.21 There are also the fascinating "conceptual separability" cases, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
10.

See P. Atiyab, The Legacy of Holmes Through English Eyes in HOLMES AND THE

COMMON LAW: A CENTURY LATER, supra note 8, at 59.

11. Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. Rav. 567, 571 (1971).
12. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83 (1960).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 83-84.
15. Id. at 84.
16. Id.

17. The author has observed copyright law issued for almost twenty years as a judge.
Before then, as a practicing lawyer, the author also very occasionally had such opportunities.
See, e.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Co., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966)

(representing the plaintiff in a case involving alleged copyright infringement of advertisement).
18.

536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en bane).

19. Id. at 487-90. The Second Circuit held that copyright was not appropriate for a
reproduction of a public domain toy bank concluding that "no such originality, no such expression, no such ideas here appear." Id. at 492.
20. 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (stating that "[t]he subject matter of copyright...
includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such

material has been used unlawfully.").
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Pearl2 and Brandir Internationalv. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,2 3
involving the question of whether useful articles, in the one case belt
buckles and the other bicycle racks, can be so artistically or otherwise designed that the design is conceptually separable from the useful object - like the artist Christo's running fence of draped material across a mountain canyon.24
It seems that every case that comes before us in copyright law is
a "hard" case. Is this because copyright law is so unformed, so
unique, so statutorily affected that we get only "hard" cases? Or is it
simply, as my colleague Judge Newman suggests, that copyright law
seems to be, in and of itself, fascinating because it is concerned with
creativity and the cases involve creative interests asserted by both
sides to the dispute? 25 In any event, he and I agree that copyright
'26
law generates hard issues "with uncommon frequency.
Because copyright cases involving the doctrine of "fair use"
have recently been in such public focus - two going to the Supreme
Court and having received wide attention __27 that doctrine (and the
remedies for unfair use) seems a likely starting place for this endeavor. Because each case involved a claim that copyright impairs
free speech, or rather the public's interest in receipt of information,2 8
there is an extra element of fascination involved. This element is one
that has not gone unnoticed by the commentators. 29 Professor Goldstein in a delightful article asserted:
22. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
24. See Glueck, ChristoDrapes Miami Isles in Pink, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1983, at C19,
col. 1 (describing the 1972 work of Christo which suspended a fabric curtain between a pair of
Colorado mountain peaks and a 24-mile nylon "running fence" in northern California); see
also Wilson, The World According to Christo, L.A. Times, Sept. 29,.1985 (Calendar), at 90.
25. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
459 (1988).
26. Id. at 460.
27. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
28. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976) (holding that consumers had a first amendment right to contest a
statutory ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices).
29. The late Melville Nimmer, whose copyright treatise is happily being carried on as a
family venture, wrote extensively about the supposed collision between free speech and copyright. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B], [D] (1988). Indeed, his last major work, published
just before his untimely death, was on freedom of speech; there he writes at length of the
collision. NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.05[C] (1984); see also W. PATRY, THE FAIR
USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 467 (1985) (arguing that copyright legislation "in the

broader sense of expression . . . is [a] vehicle for the dissemination of. . .information" because it assures authors that others will be unable to copy their works (emphasis in original)).
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The first amendment provides a model for the proper governance of
copyright's statutory and enterprise monopolies. The model requires that first amendment objectives be promoted through accommodation of the public's interest in access to a diverse range of
intellectual expression with maintenance of the property interest
fiecessary to afford incentive to the creation and dissemination of
expression. 0
And there is also the Second Circuit's tantalizing and oft-quoted
statement that "[c]onflicts between interests protected by the first
amendment and the copyright laws thus far have been resolved by
application of the fair use doctrine."31 This sets the scene: "thus far"
has a lack of finality - an unsettled state - that goes with what
Gilmore has called the "Age of Anxiety" 32 in which our jurisprudence is in today. Perhaps, as Gilmore concluded, "the beginning of
wisdom [will] lie.., in [our] recognition that the body of the law, at
any time or place, is an unstable mass in precarious equilibrium." 33
I.

FAIR

UsE -

AN EQUITABLE DOCTRINE?

Is fair use an equitable doctrine? Fair use as a concept may be
said to have begun seventy-five years after the Statute of Anne," in
Sayre v. Moore3 5 with Lord Mansfield's charge to the jury - reminiscent of our own copyright clause,3 6 - in a case involving a sea
chart incorporating (and, mercifully to seamen, correcting) the
plaintiff's prior charts:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time
for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the pro30. Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1055
(1970).

31.

Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978) (emphasis added).
32. G. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 68.
33. Id. at 110.
34. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned. 8 Anne, ch.

19 (1710).
35. See Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b) (K.B. 1785) (reproducing the
case of Sayre v. Moore).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power...; To Promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings .
I.
Id. at cI. 8.
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gress of the arts be retarded.3 7

We need not track the concept and its application in the differing contexts of abridgements, maps, legal reports, scholarly books,
plays, movies, parodies, and the like. Suffice it to say that in Folsom
v. Marsh,38 Justice Story - emulating Mansfield, perhaps, 39 stated without using the term "fair use" the factors bearing on privilege or excuse for infringement: "the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work."" ° It is not without
significance that Story, wearing another hat as treatise writer on equity jurisprudence, referred to these factors in his treatise.' 1 This reflected, perhaps, more the fact that to restrain publication of the alleged infringing work required the aid of a court of equity - here
again the importance of the remedy - than it did any conceptual'
ization of the doctrine as "equitable" rather than "legal." 42
I note that the first reference to the doctrine, which is now fully
embodied in the modern statutory equivalent of the Statute of Anne,
the 1976 Copyright Act,'3 was apparently in Lawrence v. Dana."
Justice Kaplan refers to Judge Clifford's foray in Lawrence as
grounded in the thought that fair use was the "sort of taking which
on such consideration [of Story's factors] would be held noninfringing."' 5 So too with Learned Hand's exposition in Nichols v. Univer37. Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. at 140 n.(b). The concept might have even started
with Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (1761) (involving the printing of a part of a
narrative, leaving out "all the reflections," of Samuel Johnson's Rasselas in the "Grand Magazine of Magazines."). Because the defendants had not interfered with the sale of Johnson's
book, the bill in equity was dismissed per the Master of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Clarke. For this
and other historical references, I am indebted to Justice/Professor Benjamin Kaplan. See B.
Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 11 (1967).
38. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
39. See G. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that Justice Story frequently praised
Lord Mansfield's approach).
40. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
41. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 939-40, 942 (1972).
42. Cf. B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 2-6 (referring to the esoteric, if rewarding, pursuit

of the century and more of monarchial attempts to control the press that marked the impact of
the Court of Chancery (or rather the Lord Chancellor) in this field).
43.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use

by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means ... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." Id.
44. 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
45. B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 67.
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sal Pictures Corp.,"' fair use is simply the converse of infringement.47 While fair use may not be indispensable as a separate
conceptual doctrine, 48 it is one now given independent life by our
governing statute and Sony49 and Harper & Row50 in dealing with
the statute.
But to acknowledge its separate existence is not necessarily to
say that - even after taking its four non-exclusive Harper & Row
factors 51 into account - we have come to the end of any respectable
inquiry. These factors 52 are, of course, (1) the purpose and character
53
of the use, what Judge Leval has called the "justification" for it;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the
copyrighted work. But like Justice Kaplan, I would "recur to the
point that 'fair use' invokes policy as does the rest of the subject of
plagiarism, and in no markedly different sense."" Thus, I do not
have the fear that was expressed to me the other day by a distinguished copyright authority, now a federal judge, that "fair use" is
subsuming all of copyright law. But now you may see what I meant
at the beginning of this article about collapsibility of doctrine in law
-- fair use collapses into plagiarism, but what is plagiarism? Both
involve policy, but what is policy?
II. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE AT PRESENT:
ITS RELATION TO FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS?

Thus, I come to the critical question in determining what is fair
use or plagiarism: does the public's right to receive information play
any role? Notice that I do not use the phrase free speech or free
46. 455 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
47. B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 67 n.93 (citing Gorman, Copyright Protectionfor the
Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 1569, 1602-05 & n.136 (1963)).
48. Id. at 67-68. This is a sanitized version of saying that there is no doctrine, there is
simply a phrase that involves a congeries of policies applicable to different factual contexts.
"Fair use," in copyright law, is a rough equivalent to "consideration" in contract law: it has its
place, perhaps, but it is hardly an end of analysis. See G. GILMORE, supra note 7,at 138 n.30.
Thinking otherwise is wooden, cabining, stultifying as it were.
49. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
50. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
51. Id. at 560-61.
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the factors that determine fair use).
53. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co. Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1507
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), afid, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
54. B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 69-70.
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press. The language of our great first amendment,55 indeed much of
the thinking and writing on it, focuses too narrowly on the speaker's
right to speak or the press's right to print; on the person who is conveying information. But a whole congeries of cases in the last decade
or so have reinforced the view stated by the Supreme Court in 1945,
that the premise of the first amendment is that "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public.""6 The commercial free speech
cases and many others have made this public right to receive infor57
mation of clear constitutional concern.
Is that public right to be taken into account in determining
whether there has been fair use? Here, language from the Supreme
Court's majority opinion in Harper & Row seems negative: "It is
fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser
rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public.
Such a notion ignores the major premise of copyright and injures
author and public alike." 58 The Nation's first amendment defense,
said the Court, "would expand fair use to effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a public figure." 5 9 A
Second Circuit case, Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,60 in rejecting a news broadcaster's claim
that it had a first amendment right to use portions of Charlie Chaplin's films in the broadcast coverage of Chaplin's death, said that
"[n]o Circuit that has considered the question.., has ever held that
the first amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine."6 1
Patry has stated that because copyright protects the expression of an
idea but not the idea itself, "the only possible conffict between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act lies in the author's expression, viz., his individual characterization, phrasing, or styling of
ideas. No court has ever held that the public has a right to know
55. US. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
56. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
57. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
58. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
59. Id. at 557.
60. 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
61. Id. at 1099.
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expression. ' ' e
But counterbalancing these views are those in Justice Blackmun's opinion for the four dissenters in Sony, which were not, I
might say, disputed by the Sony majority:
The monopoly created by copyright ...

rewards the individual au-

thor in order to benefit the public ....
There are situations, nevertheless, in which strict enforcement
of this monopoly would inhibit the very 'Progress of Science and
useful Arts' that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the
ability to refer to and to quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no author could create a new work if he were first required
to repeat the research of every author who had gone before him.
The scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain with each copyright owner for permission to quote from or
refer to prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the
scholar and the ordinary user. When the ordinary user decides that
the owner's price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the
individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior
work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived
of his contrib'ution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in other
63
words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits.
Justice Blackmun - remember the minority for which he was
speaking held that VCRs were not a fair use - went on to reflect
that each of the fair uses to be protected under the legislative history
of the 1976 Act "is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit
to the public beyond that produced by the first author's work.""
And of course first amendment lawyers and commentators take the
strong position: "First Amendment values should not be considered
as an alien intruder into copyright law but as a basis for making that
law still more responsive to the shared values of our nation." 5
Thus, I will assume for further purposes here, without necessarily agreeing with the proposition, that the fair use doctrine and a
62. W. PATRY, supra note 29, at 466.
63.
(footnote
64.
65.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477-78 (1984)
omitted and emphasis added).
Id. at 478.
Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 1, 12 (1987)

(Floyd Abrams represented the defendant, The Nation, in Harper &Row); cf. Roy Export Co.
Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.) (stating
that first amendment values are adequately protected by application of the fair use doctrine),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
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first amendment "privilege" are mutually incompatible. But I underscore the word "privilege," which I define as a defense. The claim of
a first amendment right, including the public's right to knowledge, I
will concede for purposes of discussion, is not a defense to an action
for copyright infringement.
I submit, however, that having thus defined the substantive
right we have not even begun to discuss the correlative remedy.
What is the infringed author's remedy? More specifically, does it
include an injunction against publication by this infringer? More
specifically still, may the considerations mentioned by Justice Blackmun in Sony - the "contribution to knowledge"661 of the public, if
you will - be taken into account at the remedial stage? This is a
question as yet unanswered, at least by the Supreme Court. My suggested answers follow.
III.

INJUNCTIONS

The answer to the question, what is the infringed author's remedy (as it usually is in law) is that it depends on the circumstances.
Let us take the easy cases - the case of piracy or what is called in
the garment industry the "knock-off' case -where an opportunistic
competitor (another author/publisher) seeks to profit from the words
written, the song composed, the film produced by the original author,
composer or producer, as the case may be. A pirated or copied edition, record, movie, song or other work needs more than the protection of a suit for damages; it cries out for an injunction. This is true
because the "qualified monopoly running for a limited time"6 (what
we call copyright protection) is necessary to prevent freeloaders from
stifling the incentive to create and promote the "Progress" of the
"useful Arts."6 8
Thus, the easy cases readily lead to the grant of an injunction.
In the first place, they suggest that "[iirreparable harm may ordinarily be presumed from copyright infringement."6 9 Secondly, damages
70
for infringement may be difficult to assess.
66.
67.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 478.
B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 75.

68. See supra note 36.
69. Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1985); see
Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding
that irreparable harm can be presumed by a showing that reproduction of a work will "materially reduce the demand for (the plaintiff's] services.").
70. See Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329, 1337
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that it is impossible to estimate the damage that results from the
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But as we pass from the easy case toward the harder cases where the infringer may have been "innocent" in the sense of not
knowing or having ground to suspect of the plagiarism of another,7
the appropriate remedy becomes more difficult to fashion. A good
example is where the alleged infringer's purpose is to parody (which
by definition is mimicry of an author's characteristic style) with the
aim of ridicule, spoof, or just plain humor.72
Does copyright infringement per se mean that the equitable
considerations ordinarily involved in the issuance of injunctions are
to be cast to the winds? An infringed plaintiff may be estopped from
obtaining his equitable, or, for that matter, any other remedy. He
may have been guilty of laches"4 to the prejudice of the infringer. In
such cases the copyright holder may be denied an injunction, even if
not damages. 75
Or the person claiming infringement may come into court with
"unclean hands,' '7 as two members of the panel held Howard
Hughes had done when he sought to suppress an unauthorized biography. 77 After learning that Random House was thinking of publishloss of the exclusive use of a copyright); Marvin Worth Prod. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F.
Supp. 1269, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding "that the showing of 'Dirtymouth' [the infringing work] contemporaneously with Worth's Film will undoubtedly injure the latter...
but [that] the measurement of what plaintiffs' damage may have been at the conclusion of
trial would be complex, problematical and unscientific.").
71. See, e.g., De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
862 (1945); Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939).
72. Compare Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956) (finding that a
burlesque parody of an author's dramatic work was, nevertheless, an infringement of copyright
law) with Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (holding that a "skit, shown on the television program 'Saturday Night Live,'
poking fun at New York City's public relations campaign and its theme song," was protected
fair use).
73. Houts v. Universal City Studios, 603 F. Supp. 26, 31-32 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding
that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting that a work was fictional after he represented the
work as factual to the public).
74. The word "laches" means culpable delay in asserting a claim and is a marvelous old
Norman-French term coming from the Latin "laxus" or "lax."
75. See West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F.2d 833, 838 (2d Cir.
1910); Balckburn v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 554, 554 (S.D. Cal. 1936) (finding in
both cases that plaintiffs delay of 7 years and 16 years, respectively, in bringing an action
barred the customary relief of an injunction or accounting).
76. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 29, § 13.09[B] (discussing the use of the
equitable doctrine by the courts, and stating that the misconduct by the plaintiff must directly
contribute to the harm suffered by the parties.).
77. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-12 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). What irony there since Hughes had a morbid dread
of unclean hands!
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ing an unauthorized biography, Hughes granted one of his Nevada
enterprises, Rosemont Enterprises, an exclusive contract to publish
his authorized biography and Rosemont purchased the copyrights to
some earlier Look magazine articles about Hughes.7 8 When Random
House did publish, Rosemont sued to enjoin, claiming copying of the
Look articles. 9 Judges Lumbard and Hays thought the old equitable
doctrine of unclean hands should prevent the issuance of an injunction.80 Unless I am mistaken, that is still the law of the Second Circuit, even if they also concurred in Judge Moore's broader opinion
resting on "the public interest in the free dissemination of informa82
tion," 81 to which I will allude below.
And the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex is still at work:
"insignificant" infringements may permit wise exercise of discretion
by denying issuance of an injunction.83 Thus, in short, the issuance
of an injunctive remedy in copyright cases is subject to the same
informed discretion of the court that it is in other areas of law. Justice Kaplan pointed this out forcibly some years before passage of
the 1976 Act by stating that "courts have sometimes forgotten that
an injunction does not go of course; the interest in dissemination of a
work may 4 justify a confinement of the remedy to a money
8
recovery."1

The 1976 Act left the grant of an injunction permissive by use
of the word "may." 85 This was done advisedly;88 prompting the lead78. Id. at 303, 305.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 311-12. "Hughes wanted nothing written about himself, the publication of
which he could not control. The Rosemont Corporation was created to this end." Id. at 313.
81. Id. at 307.
82. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text; see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 29, § 13.09[B].
83. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908) (quoting the "tersely
stated ... opinion of the Court of Appeals" which held that "the proportion [of copied material] is so insignificant compared with the injury from stopping appellee's use of their enormous volume of independently acquired information that an injunction would be
unconscionable.").
84. B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 73. Kaplan went on to add that the public interest
might "suggest the legislative use, in proper doses, of the device of a compulsory license." Id.
That "device" is a legislative prescription in the case of innocent infringers where there has
been no notice. See 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1988).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). This section states:
Remedies for infringement: Injunctions.
(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of Title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of
a copyright.
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ing commentators to agree.87 The Supreme Court, in Harper &
Row, recognized that "rigid application of the copyright statute...
on occasion . . .would stifle the very creativity which that law is

designed to foster.""" And while the Second Circuit's Salinger v.
Random House, Inc.,89 did say that "[i]f [an author] copies more
than minimal amounts of.. . expressive content, he deserves to be
enjoined," 90 notice how that sentence is phrased.91 Besides referring
to expressive content, the pejorative, "deserves to be," suggests a
wrongfulness that goes beyond the ordinary. It does so also in a case
that arguably involves underlying or tacit considerations of privacy
that raise a whole other set of problems.92
The ultimate question remains: is the public interest in the dissemination of knowledge to be taken into account at all in determining whether an injunction should issue? The question is open, unanswered at least by the Supreme Court. This I believe remains true
despite the language of the majority opinion in Harper & Row that
"[i]t is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to
(b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in the United States on the person
enjoined; it shall be operative throughout the United States and shall be enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States court having
jurisdiction of that person. The clerk of the court granting the injunction shall, when
requested by any other court in which enforcement of the injunction is sought,
transmit promptly to the other court a certified copy of all the papers in the case on
file in such clerk's office.
Id.
&

86. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, reprintedin 1976 US. CODE CONG.
5659, 5776.
87. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 29, § 14.06[B] at 14-56.2 & 17.28.

ADMIN. NE\VS

88. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 n.3 (1985)
(quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57,
60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
89. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).

90. Id. at 96.
91. "Expressive content" is not the same as language, fact, or idea; rather it is related to
"expression." This sentence leaves open the situation referred to by Judge Leval; "it may be
'the words used by [a] public figure (or the particular manner of expression) that are the facts

calling for comment.'" New Era Publications Int'l v.Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576,
592 (1989) (quoting New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp.
1493, 1502 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
92. Compare Note, Fair Use of Unpublished Materials in the Second Circuit: The Letters of the Law, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV.417, 457-60 (1988) (arguing that the unacknowledged
motive of the court in Salinger (to protect his privacy interests) is disturbing because this is
not the aim of copyright law) with Newman, Copyright Law and the Protectionof Privacy, 12

COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 459, 479 (1988) (asserting that privacy interests should play an important role in copyright law in order to promote and protect the creative process).
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the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise of copyright and
93
injures author and public alike."

I say this because we are talking about the remedy for a conceded infringement. An injunction is, as the Supreme Court recently
reminded us in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,"" a drastic remedy.
In determining whether to grant an injunction in every field other
than copyright, the "public interest" is a factor to be taken into account. The Supreme Court has said: "Courts of Equity may, and
frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go
when only private interests are involved. 95
Injunctive relief should remain a matter of informed discretion
in the law of copyright infringement as it does in the law of nuisance, riparian rights, trespass, or other torts. 8 If we take really
hard cases in copyright involving histories or biographies (which are
after all personal histories), as stated by my late colleague Judge
Moore, "it is both reasonable and customary for [historians or] biographers to refer to and utilize earlier works dealing with the subject
of the work and occasionally to quote directly from such works."97
There is, Judge Moore went on to say -

and I agree -

a "public

benefit in encouraging the development of historical and biographical
works and their public distribution."98 1 Professor Chaffee said in
1945: "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work
of our predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant
can see farther than the giant himself.' "I"
What is the alternative, particularly in an era when, as the
Harper & Row and Salinger cases have forcibly reminded us, unpublished expressions have copyright protection? If injunctions issue
woodenly, as a matter of course, only authorized biographies will
occur; these will be sanitized - free from allusion to expressive
comments of the biographer, be she alive or deceased - just as
93. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
94. 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982).
95. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944) (quoting Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
96. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt, Co., 873 F.2d 576, 596 (2d Cir.
1989); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1988).
97. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966).
98. Id.
99. Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511
(1945) (quoting 17th century Robert Burton).
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Howard Hughes wanted his surroundings and his biography, 100 or
apparently as Frank Sinatra wanted his. Only expletive-deleted histories would be published; after all, President Nixon's taped comments to his White House associates were unpublished, although forcibly expressed comments on history in the making. What of
interviews with public figures? Is it too farfetched to suggest that
these too will, on the threat of a copyright injunction, be able to be
controlled, sanitized or "authorized"?
In the end I come down with Professor Goldstein and Justice
Kaplan. I come down with the former's view that "[c]opyright doctrine should . . . conform to the general constitutional rule which

restricts use of the injunctive remedy against conduct which is consonant with first amendment rights," 10 1 once again with the qualification that those rights encompass the public's right to receive information or knowledge.
And I come down with Justice Kaplan's prescient observation in
1967 that "when copyright has gone wrong in recent times, it has
been by taking itself too seriously, by foolish assumptions about the
amount and originality open to man as an artificer, by sanctimonious
pretensions about the inequities of imitation."10
Justice Kaplan went on to say, and I agree, "I confess myself to
be more worried about excessive than insufficient protection."113 Finally, I agree with Chateaubriand: "[t]he original writer is not one
who imitates nobody, but one whom nobody can imitate."'1'
ADDENDUM TO KAPLAN LECTURE
When the Kaplan Lecture was conceived and during its preparation, New Era PublicationsInternationalv. Henry Holt & Co.'05
came before the court and the author had hopes that some of the
thoughts expressed in the lecture might be incorporated in the opinion. 106 The panel opinion, however, did not accept the position taken
above.10 7 Even while upholding the denial of an injunction on the
100.
101.
102.
103.

Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 306.
Goldstein, supra note 30, at 1033.
B. KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 78.
Id.
104. J.BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 419 (15th ed. 1980).
105. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
106. Indeed, I would be less than candid if I did not say that some of the work on the
New Era case helped sharpen some of the thoughts above expressed.
107. See supra notes 95-104 (arguing that the public interest in the dissemination of
knowledge is a consideration in determining whether an injunction should issue in copyright
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basis of an equitable doctrine, the doctrine of laches, the panel majority, consisting of Judges Miner and Altimari, seemed to the undersigned to go out of its way to repudiate Judge Leval's opinion. 10 8
Whether one regards the panel majority's comments as dictum, 10 9
this issue was joined by a petition for rehearing en banc."10 A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, there being no majority in
favor thereof.111
Both the opinion concurring in denial of rehearing en banc and
the opinion dissenting from it are interesting for what they do and do
not do. Judge Miner's concurring opinion again quotes Harper &
Row in saying that "[tihe right of first publication encompasses not
only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the choices of
when, where, and in what form first to publish a work,"' 1 2 and maintains that "[t]he case at bar did not present one of those rare situations where fair use might be found."" 8 It went on to say that
"[o]nly with respect to the fourth [fair use] factor, effect upon the
potential market, [17 U.S.C.] § 107(4), did the panel majority disa4
gree with the district judge.""
More importantly, Judge Miner's opinion agrees with Judge
Newman's that the Second Circuit is not committed to the proposition that the copying of some small amounts of unpublished expression to report facts accurately and fairly can never be fair use. The
majority, however, would not have hinged the outcome on the distinction between "factual reportage" and text enlivening. Interestcases).
108. New Era, 873 F.2d at 580-84.
109. Id. at 585 (Oakes, C.J., concurring).
110. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989). Another issue, equally important to copyright law perhaps, but having no bearing on the main
point made in this Article, was also joined. That other issue was whether expression may be
copied to report facts accurately. For an important discussion of that point, see id. at 662-63
(Newman, J., joined by Oakes, C.J. and JJ. Kearse and Winter, dissenting).
111. Judge Miner concurred in the denial in a separate opinion in which Judges Meskill,
Pierce, and Altimari joined. Judge Newman dissented from the denial in a separate opinion in
which the author with Judges Kearse and Winter joined. Judges Feinberg, Cardamone, Pratt,
and Mahoney declined to join either opinion, although, of course, the denial of rehearing en
banc does not tell us how any one of them would have voted; all it tells us is that joining the
four who dissented, there could have been no more than two of them and possibly either one or
none. Only the court itself knows, and our rules do not call for or permit disclosure of the
underlying vote. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(b).
112. New Era, 884 F.2d at 660 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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ingly, it cites, as does the dissenting opinion, to Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.11 5 The majority then
goes on to say that Consumers Union was wrongly decided according
to Harper & Row because "fair use is never to be liberally applied to
unpublished copyrighted material." 1 6 This does not provide much
reassurance to biographers and journalists despite the dissenting
opinion's comment that "we do not believe that biographers and
journalists need be apprehensive that this Circuit has ruled against
their right to report facts contained in unpublished writings, even if
some brief quotation of expressive content is necessary to report
those facts accurately.""" Obviously some line-drawing needs to be
done, and whether it will be the "brief quotation of expressive content . . . necessary to report . . . facts accurately" 18 of the dissent,
or overly liberal application of the fair use doctrine within the concurring opinion is a question for resolution from any given panel
which may include one or more of the four who did not express
themselves on this issue. 1
There is also something significant in the opinions with reference to the denial of rehearing en banc. The concurring opinion, in
its own words, no longer "precisely tracks the infelicitous language
of Salinger: An infringer who 'copies more than minimal amounts of
(unpublished) expressive content . . . deserves to be enjoined.' "1 0
Indeed, the concurring opinion says that "[a]ll now agree that injunction is not the automatic consequence of infringement and that
equitable considerations always are germane to the determination of
whether an injunction is appropriate.' 121 This is reinforced by a quotation of the statute authorizing injunctions, adding emphasis to the
statutory word "may.' 22 The concurring opinion then goes on to say
that:
The panel majority maintains its view that an injunction would
have been a proper remedy in this case except for the controlling
115. 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984), cited in
New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt, Co. 884 F.2d 659, 661 (2d Cir. 1989); New Era,
884 F.2d at 663 (Newman, J., dissenting).
116. New Era, 884 F.2d at 661.
117. Id. at 663.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 661.
120. Id. (quoting Salinger v, Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987)).
121. Id.
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1988); supra note 85 (quoting this statute).
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issue of laches, but has proposed to amend its opinion at 873 F.2d
576, 584

. .

. to read as follows: "Since [under ordinary circum-

stances] the copying of 'more than minimal amounts' of unpublished expressive material calls for an injunction barring the unauthorized use, id. at 96, the consequence of the district court's
findings seem obvious.123

So now, at least, an injunction is called for only "under ordinary
circumstances," and not in every case. Will this be solace to the historians and biographers and journalists who have been concerned
about New Era and have written at length in the pages of the New
York Law Journal and elsewhere about this case and Salinger? 24
I do not know the answer to the question I have just posed, but
surely there will be some solace in the dissenting opinion, especially
because it was written by Judge Newman who not only has contributed so much penetrating analysis to the law of copyright, but also
was the author of the opinion in Salinger. His dissenting opinion, in
a footnote, clarifies the sentence in Salinger which states that "[ilf
[the biographer] copies more than minimal amounts of (unpublished) expression, he deserves to be enjoined,"125 the sentence which
Judge Miner's concurring opinion referred to as "infelicitous. '"126
Judge Newman clarifies the sentence from Salinger as being
concerned with the issue of infringement, not the choice of remedy.
Indeed, there was no dispute as to remedy in that case at all once
infringement was found, since the infringing work had not been
published and the injunction sought and issued in that case required only some deletions from galley proofs. It would have been
preferable to have said in Salinger "...

liable for infringement.'

27

he deserves to be found

This is a real plus for the publishing business and the writing profes123. New Era Publications v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1989).
124. See Schlesinger, The Judges of History Rule, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1989, at A16,
col. 3; Kaplan, Copyright Suit Reveals Unusual 2d Circuit Rift On Issue Of "FairUse",
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Copyright Chaos, 1989, The Nation, June 5, 1989, at
759; Wishingrad, First Amendment 'FairUse, N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1989, at 2, col. 3; Abrams,
The 'New Era' Decision - A New Era for Copyright?, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1989, at 1, col. 1;
Goldberg & Bernstein, Fair Use - The Biographer'sBane, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1989, at 3, col.
1; McFadden, Court Challenges Scholars' Right to Quote From Private Documents, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
125. New Era, 884 F.2d at 663 n.1 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d
90, 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987)).
126. Id. at 661.
127. Id. at 663 n.l.
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sion. It can now be said that Salinger's language - whether or not
"infelicitous" - had to do with substance, i.e., whether there was
infringement, not remedy and whether that infringement should be
enjoined. This is not just because Judge Newman, the author of Salinger, authored the dissenting opinion of New Era which qualified
the Salinger language in a footnote. It is because this qualification
was made in the en banc context, where three judges, agreeing with
Judge Newman's opinion, and four judges concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc128 supported the qualification and the change of
the panel majority opinion to use the additional phrase "under ordinary circumstances." 12 9 Henceforth, I have little doubt that the offending sentence in Salinger will be treated as going to substance,
not remedy, and, consequently, Second Circuit law will be that only
under "ordinary" circumstances will an injunction issue. Under extraordinary circumstances it will not.
What are extraordinary circumstances? That remains for future
litigation to elucidate. The bigger question is whether first amendment concerns may be taken into account in determining whether an
injunction will issue. The question is whether the public interest in
the dissemination of knowledge is taken into account at all in determining whether an injunction should issue. The question is clearly
open and unanswered by the Supreme Court, as it was before our en
130
banc ratiocinations in New Era and for the reasons stated above.
Does it remain open in the Second Circuit? Once again, as stated in
New Era, but for the "observation that the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of First Amendment in the copyright field,"1 31 that
observation "never has been repudiated."1392 Not to quibble, but Roy
Export'3 did not make'the observation in the language of the panel
majority in New Era, a point that escaped the attention of the opinions in reference to the grant or denial of en banc rehearing.1 ' What
Roy Export said was that "[n]o circuit that has considered the ques128.

New Era, 884 F.2d at 660, 662 (Miner, J., Meskill, J., Pierce, J., Altimari, J.,

concurring).
129.
130.

See supra text and accompanying note 123.
See supra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.

131. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir.
1989).
132. Id.
133. Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
134. While it surely would have been considered had there been a vote to rehear en
banc, since an affirmative vote did not take place, the question of the language in Roy Export
was not one up for discussion.
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has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privi-

lege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine." ' 5 This is quite different, I suggest,
from saying that the fair use doctrine "encompasses all claims of
First Amendment in the copyright field." 1 " But even if it were the
same, it goes to the substance of the law of fair use, not to the remedy, as to which only under ordinary circumstances (more than minimal copying of unpublished expressive material) is there a call for an
injunction. Where the public's right to receive knowledge is at issue,
is that not an extraordinary circumstance? I continue to believe that
in the issuance of injunctions, all the equities may be taken into account, one of them involving the public's right to knowledge.
Until the invention of movable type in the mid-Fifteenth Century, plagiarism was necessary for books to be read and well into the
Seventeenth Century "originality carried no cachet," Shakespeare
taking plots and characters from wherever he pleased without acknowledging sources or permitting anyone to print his works without
royalties. 37 It is only in the Eighteenth Century that "as the idea of
the original author took shape, so did its shadow, plagiarism. '" 8 But
it must be remembered that we are not talking here about plagiarism or piracy, a fundamental distinction that must be kept in mind.
Rather, we are talking about the work of historians, biographers and
journalists. Professor Schlesinger believes that, "when responsible
scholars gain legitimate access to unpublished materials, copyright
should not be permitted to deny them use of quotations that help to
establish historical points." 3 I agree in a large sense. What we
should be concerned with is the kind of writing and the quality of
use that should enter into the choice of a remedy. The finest of fine
tuning is essential, something I think Judge Leval in New Era attempted to engage in.140 What is not necessary, is a wooden-like approach that threatens to enjoin every work that quotes from an unpublished writing of a biography, history-maker or public person in
the news.
135. Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1099.
136. New Era, 873 F.2d at 584.
137. Kendrick,The Other Side of Originality, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at 13, col. 1
(reviewing T. MALLEN, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF PLAGARISM (1986)).
138. Id. at 14.
139. Schlesinger, supra note 124, at A16, col. 4.
140. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Sensitivity to the public interest has always been taken into account in the granting or denial of injunctions. Why that should be
true of all but the copyright portion of the law of intellectual property dealing with unpublished material is a question to which I cannot fathom an answer. Why is anyone so afraid of the first amendment as to think that it should not play a role? After all, the
Supreme Court has held that the first amendment bars recovery "for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
[publication of satire] without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual
malice.' "141 Copyright law has long recognized "the broad scope
permitted parody in First Amendment law. 142 We long ago stated
the general proposition that "parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom - both as entertainment and as a form of social
and literary criticism. ' 43 Indeed, recently, the Second Circuit held
that parody and satire were protected against a Lanham Act challenge, in the trademark or unfair competition segment of intellectual
property law.144
The question may be asked, are not legitimate historical, biographical and journalistic works to be given at least an equal place
in the law of intellectual property with the satirical and parodistic?
One would hope that the ultimate answer would be affirmative,
whatever confusion has been cast by the now ever so slightly but
importantly qualified Salinger and New Era decisions. In order to
accommodate the universal interests served by the law of intellectual
property, as well as to do justice or equity in the individual case, we
must for a while, until better advised, look to the remedy rather than
merely to the substantive rule of law, or at least to the relationship
between the two, to see that the law continues to grow commensurate with the times rather than recedes into the past.

141.
142.

Hustler Magazine'v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (2d Cir.

1982); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam).
143. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 542 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964).
144. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
493-95 (2d Cir. 1989).
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